Abstract: This paper describes a risk-based methodology developed to facilitate prioritization of terrorist threat mitigation strategies on individual bridges. Numerous risk-based methods have been used for prioritization among a group of bridges or other assets. However, this methodology is unique in that it is specifically designed to focus on a single bridge and the risk associated with each of its many individual structural components. "Risk," as discussed herein, describes the relative potential for a terrorist attack against a specific component and the associated consequence from the attack. It is based on such factors as the component's importance to overall structural stability, its location and thus accessibility to terrorists, and its resistance to the specific threat. The component-specific risk factors and their modifying attributes are described. The result of the methodology is a rank-ordered list of components most at risk to an attack, allowing prioritization and optimization of the mitigation design for the bridge. Once mitigation schemes are identified, the methodology can then be utilized to recalculate mitigated risk, allowing for a direct indication of cost/benefit of the mitigation design. The methodology and comparison criteria are described and a simple application example is given to demonstrate the usefulness of the methodology.
Introduction
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 , brought us all to the eye-opening realization that we are all vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Terrorists no longer just focus on airlines as targets and everything ͑or everyone͒ is vulnerable to some degree. Direct threats to several major bridges soon after September 11, 2001 quickly brought that realization to infrastructure owners/ operators. Facing always limited resources and realizing that our nation's infrastructure is too massive for an across-the-board terrorist threat mitigation effort, owners/operators have had to prioritize their bridges, essentially starting at the top with their most important and vulnerable bridges and working their way downward as far as resources allow.
Although many bridge owners have developed their own, probably the most widely used prioritization methodology has been that developed under funding from the National Cooperative Highway Research Program ͑AASHTO 2002͒. Some of the common prioritization criteria have included: Function within the infrastructure system ͑i.e., major traffic route, emergency or defense operations, etc.͒, economic importance, symbolic importance, public impact if attacked, cost/time of replacement, and relative likelihood of and vulnerability to an attack.
Most of the methodologies are risk based. This is necessary whenever a zero-risk answer is not possible or affordable. Terrorist threats are ever-evolving and adaptive. Once one threat is mitigated, the determined terrorist can just adapt and develop a new attack approach. Thus, risk cannot be totally eliminated, but only reduced as much as possible.
Since September 11, 2001 , most bridge owners have completed their prioritizations and have begun or are ready to begin mitigation efforts on their highest priority structural assets. At this point, the question once again arises: Where do we start? As with the asset prioritization problem, there are almost unlimited mitigation efforts that can be made on a given bridge, yet there are always limited resources. A rational and consistent means is required to assess and compare individual component criticality and the effectiveness of varied mitigation schemes throughout an individual bridge. This will result in a prioritization of mitigation measures for each individual bridge.
Thus, once again a prioritization is required, this time at the individual structure level. Instead of prioritizing among a group of structures, the owner must now prioritize among the individual components on a given structure to determine which are the most in need of terrorist threat mitigation efforts. For the same reasons as described earlier, the prioritization should be risk based. While the problem is very similar, the asset prioritization methods are not directly applicable to this more detailed problem. Those methods compare assets based on socioeconomic factors affecting the entire infrastructure system.
The need in this case is to compare individual bridge components based on their specific importance and vulnerabilities. Since most of the high-priority bridges are major structures with potentially massive replacement costs and economic effects if lost, importance should be primarily based on a component's contribution to overall structural stability, i.e., if the component is sufficiently damaged, the bridge will totally collapse. However, other factors such as component replacement or repair costs can also factor in. Component vulnerability will be a function of the specific threat type and size used against the component, the likelihood of such a threat, and the component's resistance to the threat.
This paper describes such a "component level risk assessment" methodology as developed by the writer. No new risk formulation was developed and it is based on the most basic of risk equations as commonly used for natural hazard risk assessments. The unique parts of this methodology are the component level approach and the component-specific criteria used to calculate the risk factors.
This methodology has recently been utilized on four major bridges within the United States ͑names withheld at request of owners͒ and has proven very consistent and useful for prioritization of the limited mitigation funds available for each bridge. The methodology is presented herein exactly as it was used. However, it should be remembered that any new procedure can always evolve/improve as experience is gained with it. Furthermore, riskbased methods can especially improve as more statistical/ probabilistic data evolve to better define the risk factors. Thus, it is the purpose of this paper to present the methodology as is and hopefully stimulate input and suggestions from others for its continued improvement.
Approach
Although risk can be determined in many different ways, in general it may be defined as follows:
where Oϭoccurrence; Vϭvulnerability; and Iϭimportance. This is a general risk equation used for many other purposes such as natural hazard vulnerability assessments ͑AASHTO 2003͒ and it is used herein for mitigation prioritization of individual bridge components. For this purpose, the bridge can be thought of as a structural "system" composed of many different components, all acting together to support the structure. It is important to remember that risk, as discussed herein, is not an actual probability. Instead, it is a measure of the subjective expectation of a total bridge collapse from a given threat against a given component. Some components are more critical to the survival of the structure than others. The location of some components may also make them more vulnerable to terrorist attack than others. Thus, for this methodology, a "component" is described both in terms of its physical nature/function and its location on the bridge structure. For example, the main cable of a suspension bridge could be considered just one component. However, for this methodology, many different "main cable" components may be considered, each with different locations, implying different terrorist threat accessibility and thus different vulnerabilities. The main cable near midspan of the main span generally drops very close to the roadway and could thus be more vulnerable to deck level threats than portions of the cable well above the deck. Thus, mitigation requirements for the cable near the roadway will be different than that sufficiently above the roadway.
The basic risk equation ͓Eq. ͑1͔͒ can thus be modified to address numerous components as follows:
where jϭindividual bridge component; iϭbasic threat; I i ϭimportance of an individual component, j, to the bridge;
O ij ϭmeasure of the relative probability of a basic threat, i-described in the following-actually occurring against the given component, j; and V ij ϭmeasure of the relative vulnerability of the given component, j, given the occurrence of the basic threat, i. Each of the above-described factors is a number between 0 and 1. The factors are actually computed using summations of the weighted attributes that define the factors as follows:
where wf k ϭweighting factor applied to the attribute, a k . "Attributes" are specific unity-based criteria of varied importance that sum together to define each factor. The variable SR is the "span ratio" and is described in a later section. While many different attributes could be included, attributes and weighting factors currently used are provided in the following. Total risk, as defined by Eq. ͑3͒, is merely a sum of all component risks to all threats considered. It is useful for providing an indication of the overall effectiveness of the total mitigation efforts on a given bridge. This factor must be used with great care as it can easily be misinterpreted. It might appear that the total risk for one bridge could be compared to that for another bridge. However, this factor is a function of the total number of individual components considered for a given bridge and this will vary greatly from one bridge to another. Thus, comparison of total risk between different bridges is meaningless unless the exact same components are considered for each.
Basic Threats
There are unlimited possibilities as to the types of terrorist threats that could be brought against bridge structures ͑AASHTO 2003͒. For purposes of the work herein, the writer has grouped threats into the following basic categories.
Vehicleborne improvised explosive device (VBIED): These include both landborne vehicles ͑i.e., truck bombs͒ that would be deployed against components reachable by land and waterborne vehicles ͑i.e., boat bombs͒ that would be deployed against any components reachable by water.
Hand-emplaced IED (HEIED): These include contact explosive devices such as satchel demolition charges and shaped charges that are commonly used by military engineers and civilian demolition experts to precisely cut/sever structural members. There are a myriad of varieties and sizes of HEIEDs and for the same reasons as discussed earlier for VBIEDs, their likelihood should decrease as charge sizes increase.
Nonexplosive cutting device (NECD): These include any nonexplosive devices such as saws, grinders, and torches that can be used to cut/sever structural members. There are infinite options for this purpose, but some are certainly much more efficient ͑i.e., faster͒ for cutting of large structural members.
Vehicular impact (VI): Like VBIEDs, these include both landborne and waterborne vehicles, depending on the location of the component of concern.
Fire: Fire of size and duration can cause structural members to lose both their stiffness and strength. Thus, a "pool fire" from such as a ruptured tanker truck on the deck of a bridge, adjacent to key components or in the water adjacent to piers or towers, is of great concern.
Importance Factor "I j … Eq. ͑4͒ is used to calculate the importance factor. It measures the importance of an individual component, j, to the bridge, considering the following attributes.
Structural importance of the component: This attribute captures the importance of the component to the overall stability of the bridge. This is the most important attribute for this factor in that the worst possible outcome to a terrorist attack would be total collapse of the bridge. Most of the high-priority bridges around the country are major long-span structures and their loss/ replacement would be economically crippling.
The following values are used herein for the structural importance attribute. Use only one of the value sets to follow, depending upon the component type: 1. Axial or flexural components, including truss chords and diagonals, beams, girders, and suspension towers: Span ratio (SR): SRϭspan length/main span length. As shown in Eq. ͑4͒, this is a separate factor by which the importance factor is multiplied. It is the ratio of the span length of which the component, j, is a part to the length of the main span. If the component is a part of the main span, then this value is one.
This factor is used to capture the fact that a component on an approach span may be very "important" to that span in terms of all the above-considered factors, but it is less important than the similar component on the main span, i.e., the main span is always the most important as, due to its extreme span length, its loss would be much more catastrophic than the loss of an approach span that could likely be quickly overbridged and brought back into service.
Since bridge cost is largely a function of span length, it is logical to use a ratio of span lengths for this importance factor. Use of this factor allows for consideration of approach span components within the same assessment, but ensures that approach spans will not rate more important than critical components on the main span.
This factor is calculated with Eq. ͑5͒ above and measures the relative likelihood of a basic threat, i, actually occurring against the given component, j, considering the attributes listed in the following. It is important to emphasize here that the importance and vulnerability factors can be rigorously and objectively defined through various calculations. However, the occurrence factor is quite subjective and does not represent an actual probability. Instead, it is a measure of the subjective expectation that threat i will occur compared to the other threats.
General threat likelihood: This attribute describes the general likelihood that terrorists prefer this type of threat compared to others. For example, history has shown that many terrorists prefer VBIEDs over HEIEDs. Even more, very few in the past have chosen nonexplosive options, and even fewer have chosen fire or impact. Ideally, this assessment will be based on counterterrorism intelligence provided to the assessors. This attribute will be the same, regardless of the component under consideration, i.e., the likelihood of a VBIED should be considered independently of which component is being consid- Visibility or attractiveness of the component: Independent of threat type, this attribute reflects the likelihood that a terrorist will recognize that the component is critical to the structural stability. It attempts to capture the fact that the structural importance of some components is not always obvious to the lesser-informed persons. The writer recognizes that it is dangerous to underestimate terrorists and their capabilities to understand their targets. As a result, this variable is given a low weighting factor ͑discussed in a later section͒, but it was deemed important to at least capture this attribute to some degree. Values used herein for this attribute are: • 1.00ϭhigh; • 0.75ϭmedium; • 0.50ϭlow; • 0.25ϭvery low; and • 0.00ϭnot attractive.
Access to the component: This attribute addresses the question: How easy is it to get to the component with the threat under consideration before a capable response occurs? Access difficulty basically leads to added time on the target, i.e., time to carry out the attack. Thus, this attribute is a function of "access time" ͑AT͒ versus "response time" ͑RT͒. Note that AT only includes the time required to reach the component with the threat and does not include the time to actually carry out the threat, i.e., inflict the damage. Time to carry out the threat is covered under the vulnerability factor where appropriate. Values used herein for this attribute are: • 1.00ϭcompletely accessible, RTӷ AT; • 0.75ϭRT probably ϾAT; • 0.50ϭRTϭAT; • 0.25ϭRT probably ϽAT; and • 0.00ϭaccess is completely denied, or you are confident that ATӷ RT. While the standoff distance of a VBIED to the component might be considered an access issue, it should not be accounted for here. It is accounted for under the vulnerability factor where an increased standoff will make the component less vulnerable to the given threat. For this attribute, a value of 1.0 should be used for a VBIED occurrence because it can always get somewhere in the vicinity of the component and it is just a matter of how close it can get, i.e., standoff, and the resulting effectiveness of the VBIED.
The same logic is used for access consideration of VI threats. The presence of traffic barriers, pier dolphins, fenders, etc., that actually limit access is accounted for under the vulnerability factor where the components are shown to be more resistant to impact if protected by a barrier.
For the fire threat, consider this attribute purely in terms of access time and do not include the time required to reduce component strength once heating begins. This time is captured under the fire vulnerability factor. Thus, for this attribute, consider the following: Can the response occur before the fire reaches the component and starts heating it? Fire control can be accounted for here because the response can occur more quickly and thus the heat will not reach the component as quickly, if at all.
Vulnerability Factor "V ij … Eq. ͑6͒ is used to calculate the vulnerability factor. It captures the relative vulnerability of the given component, j, given the occurrence of the basic threat, i. In this case, the only attribute modifying the vulnerability factor is the resistance of the component to the given threat. These can, however, be very difficult questions to answer, often requiring detailed blast analyses or reference to military demolition manuals.
Suggested general attribute values are given in the following. For security reasons, the actual threat sizes cannot be shown and specific details are replaced with the variable "x":
Resistance to VBIED: Resistance to this threat is defined in terms of the amount of explosives ͑i.e., the size of VBIED͒ required to cause "component destruction" when the bomb is as close as possible to the component. The "destruction" term is used to define a damage level sufficient that the component could not carry out its required load-carrying function. Partial damage is not considered herein. The general spread of values is: • 1.00ϭcomponent destruction with less than x explosive weight; • 0.67ϭcomponent destruction with x to 6x explosive weight; • 0.36ϭcomponent destruction with 6x to 20x explosive weight; • 0.20ϭcomponent destruction with 20x to 60x explosive weight; • 0.10ϭcomponent destruction with 60x to 120x explosive weight; • 0.06ϭcomponent destruction with greater than 120x explosive weight; and • 0.00ϭnot applicable or can withstand all of the abovementioned threats. Higher weight factors for smaller VBIED reflect the fact that they are more likely due to easier logistics in accumulating the explosive quantities and delivering them to the bridge. Unlike the attribute weights for the previously discussed factors, the VBIED weights above do not have a linear spread. In fact, they are far from a linear spread. These weights were derived using the analytical hierarchy methodology ͑Ragsdale 2002͒ and the bomb sizes used in the process were based on the writer's subjective knowledge of past event bomb sizes. These factors show that, based on historical events, larger VBIEDs are much less likely than smaller ones. The above-presented values are actually considerably more conservative than actual past history would strictly dictate. This was done because the writer recognizes that it is very dangerous and also impossible to reliably predict future terrorist behavior based on past events. However, for lack of anything better, it formed the basis for a general comparison.
For multiply redundant components, such as suspender cables, multigirders, stringers, etc., only consider here the bomb size required to take out one of the components. For the procedure herein, redundancy and its effect on risk is captured under the importance factor as previously described.
Resistance to HEIED: Resistance to this threat is defined in terms of the amount of explosives ͑i.e., the size of HEIED͒ required to cause component destruction ͑defined earlier͒ when the threat is properly placed on the component. There are a myriad of HEIED types, and thus for each component, consider the HEIED to which the given component will be most vulnerable. The specific HEIED considered for each component will vary as some components are more vulnerable to one type of HEIED whereas others will be more vulnerable to another type. The general spread of values is: • 1.00ϭcomponent destruction with less than x explosive weight; • 0.95ϭcomponent destruction with x to 2x explosive weight; • 0.70ϭcomponent destruction with 2x to 10x explosive weight; • 0.20ϭcomponent destruction with 10x to 20x explosive weight; • 0.10ϭcomponent destruction with 20x to 100x explosive weight; • 0.05ϭcomponent destruction with greater than 100x explosive weight; and • 0.00ϭnot applicable or can withstand all of the abovementioned threats. Higher explosive weight requirements here indicate less risk for two reasons: ͑1͒ it is logistically more difficult to obtain and deliver large explosive quantities and ͑2͒ it takes longer to emplace and detonate them on the target. As discussed previously for the VBIEDs, the above-mentioned weights do not have a linear spread. These values were also derived using the analytical hierarchy process ͑Ragsdale 2002͒ and somewhat reflect bomb size likelihood based on past HEIED events.
As with VBIEDs, only consider here the HEIED size required to take out one of the components, even if there are redundant components. For the procedure herein, redundancy and its effect on risk is captured under the importance factor as previously described.
Resistance to NECD: Resistance to this threat is defined in terms of the time to cut/sever the component. Here "cut" implies that the component would be cut sufficiently that it could not carry out its required load-carrying function. Partial cuts are not considered. The general spread of values is: • 1.00ϭtime to cut "very short" per component, less than x min; • 0.50ϭtime to cut= x to 2x min per component; • 0.10ϭtime to cut= 2x to 6x min per component; • 0.05ϭtime to cut greater than 6x min; and • 0.00ϭnot applicable or not vulnerable to cutting. The weights shown reflect the fact that components that take less time to cut are at higher risk. While not rigorously developed from past events ͑none exist for a basis͒, the weights shown attempt to reflect the likelihood that a terrorist would choose the NECD based on the degree of difficulty in cutting, which directly relates to time on target.
Resistance to VI: Resistance to this threat is defined in terms of the size and weight of vehicle required for destruction ͑defined previously͒ of the given component. All vehicles are assumed to be at maximum attainable speed for the approach to the given component. The presence of impact barriers should be considered here in that they protect a component, essentially making it more resistant to impact. The general spread of values is: • 1.00ϭdestruction from a "small weight vehicle" impact; • 0.75ϭdestruction from a "medium weight vehicle" impact; • 0.50ϭdestruction from "large weight vehicle" impact; and • 0.00ϭnot applicable or can withstand all of the abovementioned threats. Resistance to fire: Resistance to fire is defined in terms of the heating time required for the component to begin losing yield strength. "Strength loss" implies that the component would lose yield strength to such an extent that it could not carry out its required load-carrying function. Partial damage is not considered here. Do not consider the time for fire to reach the component as that is captured under "threat access." • 1.00ϭstrength loss in less than x min; • 0.75ϭstrength loss in less than 3x min; • 0.50ϭstrength loss in less than 6x min; • 0.25ϭstrength loss in greater than 6x min; and • 0.00ϭnot applicable or not vulnerable to fire. The factors reflect the likelihood that a terrorist would choose fire as an attack method. Terrorists should be less likely to choose fire against a component that is very fire resistant, thus it is at much less risk than one that would quickly lose its strength.
Weighting Factors for Attributes "wf k …
The attributes affecting the three risk factors ͑i.e., I, O, V͒ have been described in detail earlier. Obviously, some of the attributes should have a larger effect ͑weight͒ on the risk factors than others. For example, the "structural importance" attribute should have much more weight on the importance factor than the "historic/symbolic value" attribute. That attribute is important and should have a swaying effect between two components when all other modifying attributes are equal, but it certainly should not carry as much weight as the structural aspect, which indicates bridge stability against collapse. The "wf k " weight factors in Eqs. ͑4͒-͑6͒ are used for this purpose.
These factors were derived using the pairwise comparison procedure of the analytical hierarchy process ͑Ragsdale 2002͒. This method provides a systematic and consistent way to develop weight factors among a group of related variables. As there are no detailed data on the relationship between these variables, the input to the comparison matrices is quite subjective and thus it is best to utilize subjective input from as many knowledgeable sources as possible. Each of these sources is asked to assign a numeric value to the relative importance of one attribute over another. While there is still much room for improvement of these factors, the resulting weight factors from a small group consulted by the writer are shown in Table 1 .
Accounting for Mitigation Measures
Once the baseline ͑i.e., current condition͒ risk has been calculated for each component/threat combination, the ranked risk values will provide a direct indication of mitigation priorities, and mitigation schemes can be developed. The effectiveness of mitigation efforts on a specific component/threat combination can be seen by recalculating the risk using the same methodology. The baseline risk can then be compared to the mitigated risk in terms of risk reduction.
For purposes of this discussion, mitigation will be discussed in terms of the following four "D" mitigation categories The following guidelines are offered for determining the effect of the mitigation measures on the three risk factors.
Importance factor: As the component's historical/symbolic value, repair cost, or replacement time cannot generally be changed, the only attribute that could be affected for this factor is structural importance. In some cases, redundancy or alternate load paths can be added into the structural system, thereby reducing the individual component's overall structural importance.
Occurrence factor: There are four attributes defining this factor. The "general threat likelihood" cannot be changed by mitigation efforts as that attribute is merely a reflection of the local terrorist's choices in general.
Most deterrence measures should be captured by the "threat likelihood against component" attribute. The appearance of security around the component should make it less probable that the terrorist will attack the given component. Additionally, while the direct effects of denial, detection, and defense measures are captured elsewhere, just the visible presence of these measures may provide a level of deterrence as well.
The "threat access" attribute captures the direct effect of most denial and detection measures. Denial measures should increase the terrorist's access time and detection measures should decrease the time for a capable response.
Vulnerability factor: Any defense measures that make the component more resistant to the given threat should affect this variable.
Application
The application of this methodology can best be demonstrated through a generic example, the bridge for which is shown in Fig. 1 ͑specific bridges cannot be used for security purposes͒.
A "baseline" risk assessment is initially conducted for the bridge in its current condition ͑i.e., no mitigations͒. This assessment must include all components that could have an effect on the risk equation. These components must be identified through a careful study of the bridge by knowledgeable personnel to identify all vulnerable components and locations. Recall that the term component is defined herein in terms of both the structural member and its specific location. The number of components that may be considered are unlimited. Normally, an assessment of a major bridge structure would result in a list of as many as 30-plus potentially vulnerable components. However, for simplicity, only the eight components shown in Table 2 will be considered for this example. Note that the order shown is random and has no bearing on the actual risk associated with each component.
Once all components of interest are identified, the individual threat-specific risks for each component are calculated using Eq. ͑2͒ and the attribute definition guidelines provided herein. The total bridge risk can then be obtained from Eq. ͑3͒. The Table 3 . To avoid providing input to any "terrorist cookbook," the components are given generic names in Table 3 ͑i.e., not tied to those listed in Table 1͒ . Note that for the case of 8 components and 5 basic threats, a total of ͑8 ϫ 5=͒40 component risk numbers should be shown. However, the risks are very low for some component/threat combinations and they are not shown to save space. Table 3 shows the strength of the component level methodology in that there is now a ranked listing of components and their specific vulnerabilities, and thus a direct indicator of mitigation priorities. With this list, mitigation schemes can be developed along with rough order of magnitude costs for each.
For each mitigation scheme, risk should be recalculated using the same methodology with all the same components as considered for the baseline analysis. These results will provide the end product, a comparison of cost-versus-risk reduction, as demonstrated in Table 3 . The cost column could also include life-cycle cost to capture items such as electronic security that will continue to cost on a yearly basis compared to one-time cost items such as hardening. Multilevel mitigation schemes may be considered to address mitigations to different levels of threat. For example, one tower mitigation scheme may only get the allowable VBIED threat up to x explosive weight, whereas another more expensive scheme may raise it up to 5x explosive weight. The mitigated risk can be compared to the baseline risk as shown in Table 3 .
Conclusions
A unique risk-based methodology has been presented whereby mitigation efforts with limited funding may be prioritized for a given structure. Based upon recent experience by the writer on four major bridges, the methodology has proven very useful and provided consistent and believable results. As with anything new, it may appear quite confusing at first, but with a bit of practice and spreadsheet automation it can quickly become a useful tool for engineers, whether they have prior experience with risk assessments or not.
It is again reemphasized that the methodology is still very early in its development and has much room for continued improvement. Thus, it is the purpose of this paper to present the methodology and hopefully stimulate input and suggestions from others for its continued improvement. It is also hoped that this tool will add yet one more weapon to the arsenal that we as a nation can deploy in our fight against terrorism. 
